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the past 30 years 
DavidH. Pollock* 
On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of 
CEPAL, the Director of the Review commis-
sioned from Professor David Pollock an article 
analyzing the changing attitudes of the United 
States towards CEPAL since its establishment. 
Mr. Pollock is in an excellent position to write 
such an article, because of his knowledge of 
the subject and his long and important career in 
our organization. A Canadian, he joined CEPAL 
in the 1950s and has worked in Washington, 
Mexico City and Santiago, in addition to co-
operating closely for some time with the Secre 
tary-General of UNCTAD in Geneva. 
In his view, these changes of attitude 
may be grouped into five periods. The United 
States entertained reservations concerning 
the very setting up of CEPAL. In its first 10 
years, these reservations changed into open 
and continuous opposition. Then, just before 
and during President Kennedy's administra-
tion, a dramatic reversal occurred: the United 
States gave CEPAL if not an embrace, then at 
least a handshake. A further major shift took 
place after President Kennedy's assassina 
tion, leading to a decade of benign neglect. 
However, in more recent years yet another 
stage seems to have begun, marked by cautious 
reappraisal, on the part of the United States, 
of what is viewed as a "new" CEPAL. 
The author concludes with a few personal 
reflections on the significance of the previous 
trends, and what they may portend for the 
future. 
•Director of the CEPAI office in Washington. 
Introduction 
Doubts and reservations at CEPAL's creation 
CEPAL* was established in February 1948 
by the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC). The birth was not easy. 
Under Article 68 of the United Nations 
Charter, ECOSOC had been given authority 
to set up commissions in the economic and 
social fields. Thus, when the first session of 
the United Nations General Assembly was 
convened in December 1946, the Assembly 
requested that, in order to help assist with 
"the economic reconstruction of devasta-
ted areas", E C O S O C should give prompt 
and favourable consideration to the estab-
lishment of an Economic Commission for 
Europe ( E C E ) and an Economic Commis-
sion for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) . 
Both such regional commissions were es-
tablished almost immediately (in March 
1947). The Latin American delegations 
were disgruntled, feeling that their region 
had been overlooked. Mindful of the fact 
that Latin America accounted for 20 out of 
the total United Nations membership of 51 
countries at that time, noting the increasing 
role in world affairs that Latin American 
nations had begun to play as allies during 
World War II, and feeling that the Latin 
American region had many pressing eco-
nomic development problems to resolve, 
even if such problems had not resulted di-
rectly from wartime devastation, the Latin 
American governments began an active 
campaign to set up their own regional 
commission. During the autumn of 1947, 
ECOSOC established an Ad Hoc Com-
mittee1 for the special purpose of deter-
*Although the Spanish acronym CEPAL is now 
generally used even in English in the region to 
denote the Economic Commission for Latin Ameri-
ca, the English acronym EC LA has also been used 
in this paper when quoting from published works. 
Mr. Hernán Santa Cruz (Chilean repre-
sentative to fc'COSOc) presented the initial motion 
to set up this Ad Hoc Committee in August 1947, 
arguing that development should be fully as much 
a United Nations goal as reconstruction. In this 
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mining the advisability of creating an 
Economic Commission for Latin America 
analogous in structure and purpose with 
those already set up for Europe and Asia. 
The Ad Hoc Committee concluded its 
studies the following spring, with the pre-
sentation of three main arguments. One was 
that the Latin American republics had 
used up much of their capital goods at an 
abnormally rapid rate during World War II 
and therefore it was now essential to restore 
that depleted capital if the region's post-
war levels of trade and production were to 
be adequate for its needs. This argument 
was of course analogous to (even though 
not identical with) the "wartime devas-
tation" theme that had been utilized the 
year before to justify the creation of the 
ECE and ECAFE. Secondly, as a result of 
postwar price trends for manufactured 
goods, it was becoming increasingly more 
expensive for Latin American countries 
to repair and replace their capital goods. 
Thirdly, there was, at the early postwar 
stage, a generally insufficient rate of econom-
ic growth throughout the Latin American 
region. Hence many types of external 
assistance would be required if Latin 
America's own efforts at self-help were to be 
successful. On the basis of these three main 
arguments, the Ad Hoc Committee conclud-
ed that a regional economic commission 
would be helpful in facilitating Latin 
American development. 
Some developed countries had initial 
doubts about all this. Canada and New 
Zealand felt, as a general principle, that 
ECOSOC should espouse a functional rather 
than a geographical approach to postwar 
problems of economic and social develop-
ment. France had some queries about 
regard he placed major emphasis on Latin America's 
need to industrialize and diversify, in order to reduce 
the region's long-standing sensitivity to cyclical 
fluctuations emanating from the developed coun-
tries. 
establishing this new body, taking the view 
that too much stress on regionalism might 
run counter to the broad concept of multilat-
eralism. Initially the USSR was also less 
than enthusiastic, on the grounds that such 
a commission would only confuse the 
hcosoc structure (with its manifold func-
tional commissions) and that furthermore 
it might unduly enhance Latin America's 
economic dependence upon the "imperial-
istic" member countries of CEPAL. But 
these reservations by developed countries 
were soon withdrawn, finally leaving only 
the Unites States as a major critic. In 
essence the misgivings of this country 
were two-fold. One reason was financial: 
namely, the fear that the creation of CEPAL 
would require new and additional financial 
contributions from the United Nations 
administrative budget at a time when the 
United States was paying 40% of that budget. 
The second and more fundamental reason, 
however, involved the United States' serious 
concern that CEPAL would overlap with 
the OAS. At Chapultepec, Mexico, only 
a few years earlier, an Inter-American 
Economic and Social Council ( I A - E C O S O C , 
or "CIES" as it is very often called after its 
Spanish acronym) had been created within 
the OAS in order to co-ordinate all official 
inter-American economic and social ac-
tivities. Consequently, in 1948 the United 
States delegation was concerned that a 
new and separate United Nations body, 
active in Latin American development 
matters, would unduly duplicate the work 
of CIES. The Latin Americans took strong 
issue with this argument, on the grounds 
that Latin American development must 
be conceived within a global rather than a 
hemispheric framework. In their view, the 
time had come for the Latin American 
economic system to broaden and diversify 
away from the extremely close economic 
ties with the United States that had been so 
characteristic of the wartime years. A new 
postwar relationship, they felt, should have 
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a global orientation within which the United 
Nations would play a more central role.~ 
The United States stood its ground, however, 
and a temporary compromise was reached 
whereby bcosoc agreed to establishcEPAi. 
on only a three-year trial basis. Even though 
CEPAL was placed on a permanent footing 
in 1951, the complex issue of "globalism 
versus regionalism", which had already 
emerged within the United Nations political 
and security arrangements, now appeared 
in the economic and social development 
field as well. It was to remain a key issue 
during the 3 ensuing decades, as we shall 
see. At all events, from the very beginning 
the United States had placed itself in the 
position of being a major opponent, if not 
the major opponent, of CEPAL. Realizing 
that its dominant role within the OAS might 
be challenged by this new United Nations 
regional economic commission, the United 
States viewed its very birth with wariness 
and caution. This was not lost on the Latin 
Americans, and consequently even before 
CEPAL's creation the lines had been drawn 
on what was soon to become increasingly a 
relationship of confrontation. 
The geographic composition of C'fcPAL 
membership has always reflected this merging of 
regionalism and globalism. Thus, from the very 
outset, membership in the Commission has been open 
to any United Nations member state in North, 
Central and South America, including the West 
Indies, plus other non-region a] United Nations 
member states with territorial possessions in the 
area. The current members of the Commission are 
Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Domin-
ican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras^  
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Netherlands, Pana 
ma, Paraguay, Peru, Sur in ame, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uruguay, United Kingdom, United States 
of America and Venezuela, while Belize and the 
West Indies Associated States are associate mem-
bers. 
I 
1948-1958: A decade of conflictive 
relationships 
The firts session of the Commission, attended 
by high-ranking representatives of the 
member governments, took place three 
months after ECOSOC had voted for CE PAL'S 
establishment. In the meantime, the 
secretariat of the Commission had been 
organized, and a team of professional-level 
staff members began its work. In view of 
the strong United States misgivings about 
possible duplication with the OAS, the first 
order of business was to effect co-ordination 
between CEPAL and the CÍES. The result 
was a broad division of labour in which 
CEPAL's work was to be especially con-
cerned with extra-continental aspects of 
Latin America's economic problems, includ-
ing those arising from world economic malad-
justments, but with continuous liaison 
between it and the ciES. From that time 
onward, the CEPAL sessions were to be 
concerned more and more with substantive 
issues of economic research and policy and 
progressively less with problems of co-ordi-
nation with the OAS. The second CEPAL 
session took place in 1949. After the third 
session in 1950, the United States represen-
tative stated that while his government 
continued to be concerned about the possi-
bility of duplication with the CIES, it would 
nevertheless have no objections to estab-
lishing the Commission on a permanent 
basis in 1951, at least on the basis of the 
work undertaken by CEPAL to date. 
During those first few years, CEPAL laid 
the groundwork for its two major initial lines 
of endeavour, namely, the assembly of basic 
economic and social statistics on the one 
hand, and the publication of a series of 
'Since 1948, the Commission has met 
seventeen times at the Ministerial level. The first 
four sessions were held annually and thereafter 
biennially. 
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throretical and policy-oriented studies on 
the other. As regards the former, CEPAL 
began to provide, for the first time in Latin 
America's history, comprehensive statis-
tical data on both a country-by-country 
and regional basis encompassing trade, 
production, income, prices, employment, 
and a variety of other economic and social 
variables. The national income series 
were, in particular, to become a unique 
CEPAL contribution. Never before had 
data on income and product been available 
on a directly comparable basis, denomi-
nated in a common currency, and covering 
virtually all countries in the Latin Ameri-
can region. Nonetheless, despite the 
usefulness and importance of these statis-
tical publications, their compilation and 
distribution was not to comprise CEPAL'S 
major contribution. On the contrary, this 
was to lie in the realm of trailblazing and 
innovative theoretical studies: studies that 
were highly controversial when they were 
first presented but which subsequently were 
recognized as fundamental contributions to 
the postwar literature on economic and 
social development in Latin America and 
indeed internationally as well. 
Several seminal publications of CEPAL 
rapidly made their appearance. The first 
was the Economic Survey of Latin America 
(1949), followed shortly afterwards by The 
Economic Development of Latin America 
and its Principal Problems (1950) and 
Theoretical and Practical Problems of 
Economic Growth (1951). After a brief 
lull, these were followed by Economic Inte-
gration and Reciprocity in Central America 
(1952), Foreign Capital in Latin America 
(1953), International Co-operation in a 
Latin American Development Policy 
(1954), and An Introduction to the Tech-
niques of Programming (1955). Still more 
CEPAL publications were to emerge in 
prolific array throughout the remainder of 
the 1950s, but it was these early writings 
which contained the basic: tenets of what 
became known thereafter as "the CEPAL 
Doctrine". This paper is not the place 
to go into the many complex and inter-
related elements contained in that doctrine. 
This has in any case been done by a host of 
other writers.' Suffice it to say that the 
'Although the entire secretariat collabo-
rated as a cohesive team in producing these and other 
CI-PAI. studies, it is common knowledge that the 
person largely responsible for their integral design 
and theoretical substance was Raúl Prebisch, 
( hPAi.'s Executive Secretary from 1949 through 
1963. A hard-driving leader, a brilliant theoreti 
cian, and a skilled practical economist, Prebisch 
had been a professor and central banker in Argen-
tina until forced to leave as a result of political 
differences with President Juan Perón. His team 
encompassed a number of gifted Latin American 
economists, including Victor Urquidi, Jorge Ahu-
mada, and Celso Furtado, but Prebisch was un-
questionably the central directing force through-
out the initial 15 years of CEPAL's existence. In 
deed, the words "CEPAL Doctrine" and "Prebisch 
Thesis" are often used interchangeably in devel-
opment literature covering the work of the Com-
mission during its first decade. 
3
 A comprehensive bibliography, covering 
both CEPAL documents and writings by outsiders 
on those documents, will be found in the Appendix 
to Octavio Rodriguez's article entitled "On the 
Conception of the Centre-Periphery System", 
published in CEPAL Review, First Semester 1977, 
pages 233-239. Additionally, three recent Ph.D. 
dissertations provide a very extensive series of 
bibliographical references and also reinterpret 
many aspects of the original CEPAL doctrine in 
the light of current developmental literature. 
These are Regionalism and Ftictionalism in Inter-
national Organizations: The United Nations Econ-
omic Commission for Latin America, by Pierre 
Michel Fontaine, University of Denver, 1968; 
Economic Ideology and Economic Integration in 
Latin America: the Impact of
 ECLA on LAFTA, 
by John David Edwards, University of Virginia, 
1974; and The United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Latin America and National Develop-
ment Policies: A Study of Non-coercive Influence, 
by David Cameron Bruce, University of Michigan, 
1977. All three dissertations are available from 
University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan 48106. 
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CKPAL Doctrine, and the policy implica-
tions flowing from it, almost immediately 
exerted an extraordinary impact on econom-
ic thought and action, firts of all in Latin 
America and later globally as well. But in 
this very process CEPAL was to disturb 
—indeed at times even to enrage— a num-
ber of important United States individuals 
and organizations concerned with Latin 
American affairs. 
What was the central thrust of the CEPAL 
Doctrine and why did it arouse such strong 
and negative reactions among United 
States audiences? As stated above, this is 
not the place to review this in any detail. 
However, since some knowledge of the 
CEPAL Doctrine is required in order to show 
why it proved so provocative to United 
States readers in the early postwar era, I 
quoted briefly below from two books in 
which CEPAI staff members presented 
what they believed to be the essence of that 
doctrine. In the first book, nine sep-
arate but closely interrelated topics 
were singled out as encompassing the 
principal initial intellectual contributions 
of the Commission. As that book stated: 
"In broad outline, these nine topics are 
as follows: 
1. A criticism of traditional theories on 
foreign trade and, more specifically, on 
the nature of the economic relationships 
between the 'centres' and the 'periphery'; 
11
 Development Problems in Latin America: 
An Analysis by the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Latin America, a special publication of 
the Institute of Latin American Studies, The Uni-
versity of Texas Press, Austin, 1970, pages Xl-xu. 
In Professor David Bruce's dissertation, cited in 
the preceding footnote, he has described in much 
detail each of the nine points mentioned above. 
Bruce's presentation probably represents the most 
recent and comprehensive effort by a United 
States writer to delineate the main components of 
the original CI-PAI. Doctrine. 
2. A justification of industrial devel-
opment and an analysis of some of its 
main aspects in Latin America; 
3. Planning as a sine qua non for devel-
opment: its general content and techni-
cal direction, and regional planning 
experience; 
4. The raison d'etre of external financ-
ing and investment: ways of meeting 
economic growth requirements; 
5. Regional integration as a primary 
means of getting away from the 'closed' 
type of economy in post-depression in-
dustrial development; 
6. The nature of inflation in Latin 
America: an analysis of its underlying 
causes and of traditional stabilization 
policies; 
7. The social dimension of economic 
development: social determinants and 
effects of the development process, and 
changes in the structure of employ-
ment and of the social sectors; 
8. The position of Latin America vis-
a-vis world trade policy, and trade be-
tween developed and developing coun-
tries, and 
9. An overall and integrated view of 
development problems in Latin America 
and the structural changes needed to 
ensure more dynamic development and 
an equitable distribution of its ben-
efits." 
"Although these central topics are 
dealt with separately, they are clearly 
interrelated and interdependent. More-
over, a certain sequence may be noted, 
for the knowledge gained in the first 
studies and its implications are nat-
urally incorporated in the later ones, 
and give them greater depth. This does 
not mean that CEPAL started out with or 
ever had the intention of formulating a 
cut-and-dried general theory or scheme 
that would systematically cover all the 
economic, social and institutional as-
pects of Latin America's development. 
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The main factors that have gradually 
broadened the outlook or sharpened 
subsequent thinking have been the 
actual facts, Latin America's experi-
ence of the problems and situations as 
they arose, and the development of the 
ideas themselves." 
7 
In the second book, the present author 
tried some time ago to make a short syn-
thesis of the CEPAL Doctrine in a rather 
more simplified format for a student 
audience: 
"In essence ECLA'S influence rested 
on two main elements, one ideological 
and the other tactical. International 
trade flows based on comparative cost 
and advantage, said ECLA, do not 
necessarily lead to the most efficient 
utilization of world resources, and cer-
tainly not to their most equitable dis-
tribution. On the contrary, the rules 
of the game as they were put forward by 
the classical theory of international 
trade were biased against countries pro-
ducing primary products in favour of 
those producing manufactured goods. 
Under such circumstances, ECLA main-
tained, many developing countries felt 
that trade had become a vehicle for glob-
al • exploitation by a few countries 
rather than a means of maximizing 
welfare all around. This lack of eco-
nomic symmetry —this bias favouring 
the 'central' (rich) nations at the ex-
pense of the 'peripheral' (poor) 
countries— had been overlooked, 
said ECLA, in traditional approaches 
to theories of trade and growth. Worse 
yet, this economic disadvantage was 
compounded by an additional element 
of political asymmetry. To redress 
the existing lack of balance in inter-
L at in A m erican Prospects for the 1970s: 
What Kinds of Revolutions? edited by David H. 
Pollock and Arch R.M. Ritter, New York, Preager 
Publishers, 1973, pages 37-38. 
national commercial and financial 
policies, corrective negotiations were 
required between nations. Unfor-
tunately, however, negotiations be-
tween sovereign nations did not 
necessarily imply negotiations between 
equals. Thus, peripheral countries felt 
they had been maintained in a contin-
uously secondary relationship vis-a-
vis nations of the centre, not only be-
cause of outmoded economic theories 
but also because singly they could not 
exert countervailing political pressures 
on the stronger and more unified indus-
trial heartlands of the world." 
"As is well known, ECLA encompas-
ses within a single institutional frame-
work, all the Latin American countries. 
Tactically, therefore, it came to pro-
vide a cohesive organizational frame-
work for the (then 20) republics of the 
region. And simultaneously, as stated 
above, it synthesized into a single con-
ceptual framework an indigenous 
developmental philosophy. ECLA 
provided, in short, for the first time in 
Latin America's history an economic 
ideology plus a political Jorum. Both 
were broad enough to encompass the 
region as a whole but flexible enough 
to encompass a wide variety of different 
national characteristics." 
"Putting aside the institutional 
aspect, it will be seen that by the end of 
World War II Latin America's groping 
for a new and fundamental reorientation 
of its economic system had come to be 
satisfied by the so-called ECLA Thesis. 
The latter in turn rested essentially on 
a sequence of separate though interrelat-
ed ideas, which will next be briefly 
traced out". 
"A basic goal of developmental 
policy should be to increase the rate of 
growth of product and progressively 
to diffuse the fruits of such growth. In 
so doing it was essential to reduce exter-
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nal dependency. One way was to seek 
external financial commitments via 
targets for international public loan 
capital rather than rely so heavily on 
the spontaneous flow of private direct 
investment capital. A more basic ave-
nue involved a shift in the structure of 
production away from primary products 
—whose trends were too stagnant in the 
long run and too unstable in the short 
term— and toward manufactured 
) \ goods. This would enable a diversifi-
cation of exports and (highly important 
to Latin America at that particular 
time) would accelerate the possibility 
of industrial import substitution. Dur-
ing the postwar era, however, unlike 
the decades of the 1930s and 1940s, such 
fciporc substitution should take place 
in some rational planning context 
within individual countries and between 
groupings of them." 
"In all of this ECLA had clearly 
parted ways with the hitherto prevailing 
notion that the free play of market forces 
would somehow facilitate a more econ-
omically efficient system and a more 
socially equitable one. In fact neither 
the economic nor the social goals had 
thus far been attained by Latin America 
through the unfettered workings of the 
market mechanism. Nor were there 
grounds for assuming that this situation 
would now change in some spontaneous 
manner, ECLA did not oppose private 
enterprise. On the contrary its writings 
stressed from the very outset the need 
to strengthen the role of the private 
sector. But, said ECLA, the private 
sector would respond better to econom-
ic and social imperatives if the latter 
were clearly laid out within the context 
of an indicative development plan. And 
in so doing, said ECLA, it was basic that 
Latin American private initiative —-not 
foreigh— be strengthened through delib-
erate acts of policy. It was in this 
context, among others, that ECLA 
stressed so often the need for interven-
tion into the free and unfettered play 
of market forces." 
Today, the experts quoted from the 
two above-mentioned books will probably 
seem like rather conventional wisdom to 
most United States readers. But in the 
early 1950s the ideas inherent in the CEPAL 
Doctrine appeared to some of them as naive 
and to others as heretical and even danger-
ous. This was so for both political and 
economic reasons. It must be remembered 
that the Latin American countries had 
emerged from the Great Crisis of the 1930s 
and from World War II with certain reser-
vations about their extremely close politi-
cal and economic ties with the United 
States. Those ties had brought with them 
undoubted benefits, but also certain costs. 
The Latins, imbued with a desire to play a 
more active role in evolving their own post-
war economic destiny, felt that they would 
have to join together in a tactically more 
unified manner if they were to change the 
existing hemispheric rules of the game and 
thereby reduce their long-standing de-
pendency upon the United States, since 
individually they could exert very little 
leverage against their giant northern 
neighbour. And rightly or wrongly the 
Latins felt that, within the OAS, the United 
States was too often the tail that wagged 
the dog. In CEPAL, in contrast, they felt 
this situation might perhaps be reversed and 
that that organization could provide a 
caucusing forum wherein Latins could 
apply countervailing pressures vis-á-vis 
the United States for economic ends. It 
must also be remembered that the early 
1950s marked the emergence of the "Cold 
War" syndrome, with its very powerful 
emotional connotations: connotations that 
led many United States policy-makers to 
view with concern those individuals or organ 
izations not clearly aligned with them in 
the East-West conflict. CEPAL, which con-
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centrated solely on economic develop-
ment, did not align or otherwise associate 
itself one way or another on global military 
nor security issues. Thus, for the two reasons 
just mentioned —its lack of Cold War politic-
al involvement on the one hand, and its 
perceived role as a caucusing forum for 
applying economic countervailing pres-
sures vis-a-vis the United States on the 
other— CEPAL aroused many apprehensions 
within the latter country. 
Important as were the political issues 
however, those involving economic ideology 
were to prove even more important. Indeed, 
it is no exaggeration to say that, in ideo-
logical terms alone, the CEPAL Doctrine 
acted like a virtual bombshell when it was 
first promulgated. As was inevitable in 
the atmosphere then existing, some 
United States spokesmen sought to defuse 
the bomb. For that reason, as stated 
earlier, the United States was to view 
CEPAL in conflictive terms throughout 
the organization's first decade. 
The attacks on CEPAL'S writings came 
quickly and from many important segments 
of the United States community: academic, 
governmental and business alike. Academ-
ic economists of that country, for instance, 
were not slow in firing off a series of counter-
volleys aimed at theoretical chinks in the 
CEPAL armour. Their volleys were direc-
ted at many elements of the CEPAL Doctrine, 
but the critical attention of most United 
States' academicians seemed to be concen-
trated on a relatively few of these, namely 
the division of the world into a central-
peripheral dichotomy based essentially 
on the commodity composition of interna-
*In parentheses, it may be noted that almost 
exactly the same scenario was to recur, on a world-
wide scale, approximately a decade later. Thus, by 
the mid-1960s UNCTAD'S work programme (which 
in certain ways can be viewed as a global amplifi-
cation of the original CEPAL Doctrine) was to 
arouse the same negative reactions from the devel-
oped world. 
tional trade flows; the structuralist-
monetarist approaches to inflationary 
causes and cures; import-substitution -
industrialization as a priority avenue for 
alleviating the external (balance of 
payments) constraint and for absorbing 
under— and unemployed labour, and the 
inadequacy of classical trade theory based 
on comparative advantage as the theoretical 
linchpin for a new international division of 
labour. 
Important as these points were con-
sidered to be, however, undoubtedly the 
prime target of all was Prebisch's expla-
nation of the factors tending to induce a 
secular deterioration in the terms of trade of 
countries that exported primary products 
in exchange for imports of manufactured 
goods. In retrospect it is interesting to note 
three things in this regard. One is that, 
although many academic criticisms were 
focussed heavily upon the terms-of-trade 
argument during the 1950s, nonetheless 
the latter was not unequivocally disproved, 
and although United States academics 
helped to keep it from being enthroned, 
they never quite banished it from the 
kingdom. The second is that the list of such 
academics who published critiques of the 
original CEPAL Doctrine represented a 
significant group in terms of numbers.9 
Including inter alia Professors Jacob 
Viner, Gottfried Van Haberler, Benjamin Rogge, 
P.T. Ellsworth, G.M. Meier, Theodore Morgan, 
CM. Wright, V. Salera and Francis H. Schott. 
Professors Viner and Haberler were perhaps the 
most influential early critics. They, like several 
others during this period, criticised CEPAL for 
placing an undue emphasis upon industrialization 
at the expense of agriculture, often for reasons of 
"national prestige". In fact, however, the early 
CEPAL writings consistently urged that industry 
and agriculture expand hand-in-hand, CEPAL'S 
principal reasoning in this context was that, as 
productivity rose in agriculture, surplus manpower 
would be released in the process. Hence industrial 
employment was esential to absorb the workers 
leaving the farms. See for instance Jacob Viner, 
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Thirdly, as time has passed a reverse trend 
has occurred, insofar as United States' 
academics appear to have become increas-
ingly receptive to the ideas underlying the 
original CEPAL Doctrine. But more of this 
later. 
As with the academic community, so too 
representatives of the United States busi-
ness community reacted rapidly and nega-
tively to CEPAL'S publications during its 
firts decade of existence. Unlike the 
academicians, however, they were blunter 
and less concerned with theoretical sub-
tleties. In the main their ire was aroused 
by CEPAL'S undisguised espousal of 
dirigiste policies; that is to say, by its explicit 
belief that the spontaneous play of market 
forces must be tempered by judicious but 
deliberate State intermediation, in order 
to move faster and more directly towards 
certain predefined goals of international 
co-operation for development. In particu-
lar, many United States businessmen 
considered that one of those goals —that 
of accelerated internal industrialization— 
was likely to jeopardize their exports of 
manufactures to the Latin American area 
as a result of import substitution. 
This distrust of the CEPAL Doctrine 
by the United States business community 
was not surprising when considered in 
historical context. Private firms with 
large direct investments in Latin America 
felt that their short-term interests were 
furthered by the absence of governmental 
intervention and the presence of monetary 
stability in the countries of the region. In 
contrast, CEPAL'S stress on structural 
transformation through an expanded role 
of the State, and especially its recommen-
dations for deep-seated fiscal and agrarian 
reforms with concomitant repercussions 
on income distribution, seemed far more 
International Trade and Economic Development, 
Oxford University Press, 1953; pages 41-45. 
likely to trouble Latin America's politi-
cal waters than to calm them. Further-
more, in the 1950s CEPAL'S insistence on 
the need for planning struck many United 
States business leaders as too technically 
complex and too ideologically danger-
ous. Today this may seem surprising, but 
in the general mood of the 1950s, when the 
"Free Market" syndrome flourished 
so openly and powerfully in the United 
States, it was not surprising at all. 
Thus, there was a close intellectual 
nexus between the academic and business 
centres. As already noted, most academic 
writings of that era were heavily wedded to 
neo-classical economic doctrines, so it was 
not difficult for businessmen to find theo-
retical support in learned journals for their 
own pragmatic commercial beliefs, thereby 
strengthening businessmen's innate dis-
trust of CEPAL and its espousal of so 
many statist concepts. Furhermore, given 
the powerful "Cold War" syndrome of the 
1950s, those who advocated planning were 
often considered to be proposing something 
antithetical to the "American way of life" 
and certainly to the United States business 
way. 
Finally, it will be remembered that, in 
the 1950s, CEPAL was not only in favour of 
national development planning, at a time 
when any kind of governmental planning 
carried with it overtones of centrally-
controlled economic systems, but was also 
recommending target inflows of public 
capital rather than reliance on spontaneous 
inflows of private capital. Furthermore, 
CEPAL was urging Latin American protec-
tion against foreign manufactured imports 
while simultaneously recommending 
preferences for Latin American manufac-
tured exports, and new rules of the game 
for foreign direct investment in order 
deliberately to foster indigenous Latin 
American entrepreneur ship. Little won -
der, then, that the initial distrust on the 
part of businessmen quickly changed to 
66 CEPAL REVIEW/ Second half of ¡978 
open hostility, since they felt that CEPAL's 
writings were obviously not likely to create 
the kind of "investment climate" for foreign 
investment that the United States business 
community desired at that postwar juncture. 
In previous paragraphs, I noted the 
doubts expressed by the United States 
government prior to the creation of CEPAL in 
1948. Those doubts were to be magnified 
in the next few years, coming to a particulary 
volatile head in 1954. The OAS had requested 
CEPAL to prepare a report on the theme of 
development financing for the Inter-Amer-
ican Meeting of Ministers of Finance and 
Economy scheduled for Quitandinha, 
Brazil, in November 1954. 
The resulting document entitled Inter-
national Co-operation in a Latin American 
Development Policy,10 turned out to be, 
from the United States Government's point 
of view, perhaps the most controversial re-
port CEPAL had produced since its creation. 
In essence, the Quitandinha report suggest-
ed that six goals must underlie any new and 
truly effective policy of international co-
operation for Latin American development, 
namely, national development planning, 
accelerated internal industrialization, 
fiscal and agrarian reform, technical co-
operation, international trade, and new ap-
proaches to international investment flows. 
The latter point was to prove especially 
unpalatable to the United States delegation 
at Quitandinha since it was based on the 
following line of thought. In the light of 
probable terms-of-trade and other external 
sector tendencies, the constraints im-
posed Latin American economic growth by 
balance-of-payments considerations could 
best be overcome by new United States 
policy initiatives vis-a-vis Latin America. 
One way of overcoming such constraints 
would be to significantly increase foreign 
10E/CN.12/359S September 1954, United Na-
tions Publication, Sales N°: 1954.H.G.2. 
capital inflows. Although private in 
vestment would be welcomed, the empha-
sis should be on public capital since (i) the 
debt-servicing burden would be more 
predictable and less onerous than for 
private capital, (ii) public capital could 
be channelled directly towards certain 
vital end-uses, such as economic and social 
infrastructure projects that might not be 
attractive to private foreign investors, and 
most important of all (iii) since "certainty" 
is an essential element of any development 
plan, such certainty could best be ensured 
by setting public investment targets rather 
than by relying, as in the past, on unpredict-
able inflows of private capital. Conse-
quently the CEPAL Quitandinha report 
postulated a target, after a three-year 
transitional period, of at least 1 billion 
dollars in foreign capital inflows per annum 
on average. Of this total, CEPAL suggested 
that private investment should provide one-
third and international credit institutions 
the balance. To facilitate the latter, CEPAL 
recommended the creation of an Inter-
American Development Fund (almost 
exactly the same in structure and goals as 
was to emerge five years later in the form of 
the present Inter-American Development 
Bank) as a new institution designed specif-
ically for such ends. The United States 
delegation at Quitandinha was deeply 
disturbed by all this. For one thing, the 
1 billion dollar financial target was double 
the average net United States investment 
in public and private funds for the three 
years preceding the Quitandinha meeting. 
More fundamentally, however, the CEPAL 
report was highly objectionable to Treasury 
Secretary George Humphrey on grounds 
of principle. It is well known that Secretary 
Humphrey wielded a tremendous influence 
within the Eisenhower Cabinet.11 The 
"...even the most ardent admirers of 
President Eisenhower admit with readiness that the 
President to a large extent takes his cues on economic 
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significant point in this, for Latin America, 
was the fact that Mr. Humphrey 
"...was morally convinced that pri-
vate enterprise is a sacred thing, not only 
in the sense of being an essential 
foundation of a free and democratic 
society, but also in the sense that it is 
the only economic investment free 
people can rightly use to better their 
lives."12 
Furthermore 
"Secretary Humphrey believed the 
government was taking too active a role 
in the economic life of the nation; that 
taxes, especially in the upper corporate 
and individual income brackets, were 
so high as to stifle private incentive; 
that the government was spending too 
much; and that the public debt should 
be reduced. These positions led him to 
take a very cautious view of all govern-
ment spending abroad, especially for 
foreign aid programmes. Many of the 
latter programmes, he felt, not only 
took the place of private capital abroad 
but also were a charge against the public 
debt, which the nation could ill af-
ford."13 
This conservative philosophy led 
Secretary Humphrey to strongly oppose 
the much more liberal policies contained 
in CEPAL's report to the Quitandinha 
meeting, where Mr. Humphrey headed the 
United States delegation. His views were 
shared by Assistant Secretary of State Henry 
Holland (deputy head of the delegation) 
policy from George Humphrey": New York Times, 
15 January 1956, page 28. 
12New Republic, 13 December 1954, page 13. 
©•j-3— 
" Yale H. Ferguson, ECLA, Latin Amer-
ican Development and the United States: A Broad 
View, Columbia University, International Organ-
ization, Autumn 1961, unpublished manuscript 
(underlining added). 
as well as by other observers from the IBRD 
and the United States Export-Import Bank. 
They felt that the report unduly played 
down the role of private direct invesment, 
while insofar as public capital was con-
cerned, they believed that the IBRD and 
Eximbank were fully adequate for the pur-
pose, and since they were already in place 
no new inter-American lending machinery 
was necessary. Because of the strong 
United States opposition to the CEPAL 
report, nothing of consequence came of it 
at the Quitandinha meeting, but the 
Latin American governments unanimously 
rallied around that report as representing 
a reasoned and just expression of what they 
expected from the United States in the 
sense of a new approach to what the report 
called "international co-operation for 
Latin American development". 
Thus, during the 1950s CEPAL's 
Quitandinha report, together with the 
earlier documents mentioned in paragraph 
5, had come to epitomize a united Latin 
American economic policy position vis-á-vis 
the United States. Since the United States 
government viewed most of the policy 
implications of those documents as neither 
feasible nor desirable —as possessing 
dubious, radical, and even alien ideological 
underpinnings— this first decade of CEPAL's 
existence can at best be characterized as 
one in which the United States government 
viewed CEPAL de jure with caution and de 
facto with alarm. One scholar who analysed 
the United States government's attitude 
towards CEPAL during the 1950s sketched 
the general picture in the following way: 
"Understandably, ECLA was an 
anathema to the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration during its conservative years. 
The Commission stood for everything 
which the Administration did not support 
and it plagued the United States with 
logical economic arguments for changes 
in Latin American policy which the 
United States did not want to make. 
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But although there was considerable 
ill-will between the Commission and 
the Administration for many years, 
there was no open break between the 
two. ECLA'S policies generally re-
ceived kid-globe treatment and often 
even lip service from the United States. 
At the Commission sessions, United 
States economists and representatives 
were instructed to "try and keep the 
session in hand. By no means make any 
definite commitments. But act co-
operative". Whenever the question of 
ECI.A policies came up in the United 
Nations, the United States would merely 
applaud ECLA's hard work in the cause 
of Latin American development 
and say no more. All this was necessary 
because ECLA represented not only 
Latin America but also, in a sense, as 
a United Nations Commission, the rest 
of the underdeveloped world. . ." ' ' 
II 
1958-1963:4 Cordial Handshake 
if not an Abrazo 
During the first decade after World War II, 
the United States had made few if any 
economic concessions to Latin America of 
the type which CEPAL had been recom-
mending and which Latin American 
governments had increasingly begun to 
regard as representing their joint position 
vis-a-vis the United States. In the main 
those CEPAL recommendations had em-
phasized larger financial flows, especially 
in the form of "targeted" public loan 
capital; the need for more international 
commodity agreements covering primary 
products of particular export interest to 
Latin America; the importance of "implicit 
reciprocity" for trade in manufactured 
goods (i.e., some protection being per-
mitted for Latin America on infant-in-
Yale H. Ferguson,op. cit., page 48. 
dustry grounds without a corresponding 
contraction of United States market 
access);'* direct support for new regional 
and subregional integration schemes; the 
fundamental need to prepare national 
development plans, plus the establishment 
of new consultative groups to help prepare 
those plans; and the creation of a new 
financing agency, the Inter-American 
Development Bank. As already pointed 
out, those requests h ad clearly been in 
contradiction to the philosophy of the 
Eisenhower Administration. Little wonder, 
therefore, that United States relations 
with Latin America, let alone with CEPAL, 
became progressively strained during the 
1950s. A turning point came in the latter 
part of that decade, evidenced most dramat-
ically and personally during Vice-Presi-
dent Nixon's visit to Latin America in 1958. 
The animosities epitomized by the stoning 
of a United States Vice-President came as a 
profound shock to the United States people 
and government alike. Indeed, in some 
ways this incident symbolized a political 
watershed in the postwar era, since it forced 
the United States to rethink its earlier 
approach to Latin American economic 
development. Clearly something had to be 
done by the United States, and quickly. 
President Kubitschek's recommendations 
for an Operation Pan-America, the second 
report by the United States President's 
brother Milton Eisenhower, ' the arrival 
of Mr. Douglas Dillon, a new Secretary of 
the Treasury who had a significantly dif-
'The rationale here was that lower United 
States tariffs would encourage larger Latin 
American exports to the United States, the proceeds 
of which would be spent on larger Latin American 
imports from that country. Latin American pro 
tection, on the other hand, would only change the 
composition but not the level of its imports from 
the United States. 
Subsequently published under the title 
The Wine is Bitter: The United States and Latin 
America, New York, Doubleday, 1963. 
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ferent attitude to development from that 
of h is immediate predecessors George 
Humphrey and Robert Anderson, and 
—perhaps most important of all in a 
political sense— the descent of Fidel Castro 
from the Sierra Maestra, all combined to 
initiate a fundamental reappraisal of United 
States economic policies towards Latin 
America. This was institutionalized by 
three important events: creation of the 
Inter-American Development Bank in 
1959, the economic development pro-
gramme adopted at the Bogotá Conference 
in 1960, and finally the emergence of the 
Alliance for Progress in 1961. 
Almost immediately after his election 
in 1960; President Kennedy began to fo-
cus the attention of his Administration on 
Latin America. As early as the spring 
of 1961, in a formal White House address, 
he proposed that the United States should 
join forces with the Latin American repub-
lics in an "Alianza para el Progreso". 
To this end President Kennedy sought the 
views of experts from all parts of the hemi-
sphere in order to draw up a long-term 
programme, for which he pledged substan-
tial United States financial and technical 
assistance. Two elements in this new and 
bold initiative were of particular interest. 
One was the very goal itself: that of helping, 
through a hemispheric policy of develop-
ment co-operation, to bring Latin America 
to the point of self-sustaining economic 
growth within a decade. The other was the 
idea of enlisting the aid of the inter-
American system to such ends. CEPAL 
was to become directly involved in this 
process: indeed, a very interesting aspect 
of the Alianza was its endorsement of many 
ideas which CEPAL had been continuously 
advocating since 1948. As Professor 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., an architect of the 
Alianza, has stated "...in its ideas, the 
Alliance for Progress was essentially a 
Latin American product, drawing from 
Raúl Prebisch of Argentina and the United 
Nations ECLA..." This was particu-
larly so as regards the theoretical under-
pinnings of national development plan-
ning, targeted financial inflows, accel-
erated internal industrialization, inter 
national commodity agreements, and 
the strong emphasis on social reforms. 
These mirrored almost exactly the rec-
ommendations contained in CEPAL'S 
1954 Quitandinha Report: recommen-
dations which, as noted earlier, has been 
conspicuous by their absence in prior 
United States policy on Latin America. 
Now, for the first time, the United States 
and CEPAL marched side by side in their 
pursuit of the common goal of furthering 
Latin American development. For the 
first time since its creation, CEPAL was 
being mentioned by n ame in favourable 
terms by the President of the United States 
and other senior United States government 
officials. The heads of the CEPAL, 
See "The Alliance for Progress: A 
Retrospective" by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. in 
Latin America: The Search for a New International 
Role, edited by R. Hellman and H.J. Rosenbaum, 
Halstead Press, 1974, page 163. In an article entitled 
"Experience in International Co-operation and 
Development" published in Growth and Change, 
University of Kentucky, April 1970, Professor L.A. 
Rodriguez also supports the thesis that the Charter 
of Punta del Este was predicated upon the same 
basic policy recommendations that had been 
previously put forth in CEPAL's 1954 Quitan-
dinha Report. A similar thesis is presented by 
Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis in The Alliance 
that Lost its Way, Twentieth Century Fund, 1970, 
where (in referring to the Task Force on Planning 
and Development set up to help prepare the Charter 
of Punta del Este) they state that this group 
"...basically followed the line laid down by ECLA 
at Quitandinha seven years earlier..." (page 63). 
18 
In his 1961 address formally inaugurating 
the Alliance, President Kennedy requested that 
"...a greatly strengthened IA-ECOSOC, working 
with the United Nations HCLA and the Inter-
American Development Bank, should assemble 
leading experts of the hemisphere 'o help each 
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IDB and OAS secretariats formed them-
selves into an Ad Hoc Committee on Co-
operation (commonly referred to as the 
"Tripartite Committee") and began to 
work in Washington on a joint "Economic 
Survey of Latin America", on new initia-
tives for regional integration, on common 
approaches to fiscal and agrarian reforms, 
and on new attempts to secure increased 
technical assistance. It was a heady 
moment in United States-Latin American 
relations, and above all in United States-
CEPAL relations. After rebutting and 
rebuffing virtually all of CEPAL'S policy 
recommendations since 1948, the United 
States government had now changed its tack 
by almost 180 degrees. With its tremendous 
material resources, it was now deliberately 
involving itself in a collaborative pro-
gramme of hemispheric development that 
seemed to be taken holus bolus out of the 
pages of CEPAL's earlier writings. The para-
dox in all this was summarized by one per-
ceptive scholar in the United States who 
noted that 
"...those who drafted the Alliance 
commitments drew extensively on 
scholarly critiques of United States 
policy in framing their approach, and 
relied particularly on what prominent 
Latin American economists had been 
suggesting. ECLA doctrines, dis-
missed by official Washington for years, 
suddenly appeared to be accepted, as 
the United States government embraced 
such concepts as economic planning, 
regional trade agreements, and inter-
national commodity arrangements".19 
country develop its own development plans and 
provide a continuing review of economic progress 
in the hemisphere". 
» "Liberal, Radical and Bureaucratic 
Perspectives on United States-Latin American 
Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Retrospect", by 
Abraham F. Lo wen thai in Latin America and the 
However, although the United States 
government offered CEPAL a cordial 
handshake if not an abrazo during half a 
decade or so beginning in the late 1950s, 
this should not be interpreted as meaning 
that the earlier criticisms of CEPAL by 
United States academicians and business-
men had also undergone an equivalent volte-
face during the same period. As regards 
the former, critical academic attention 
continued to be devoted to various aspects 
of the CEPAL Doctrine, including in par-
ticular its terms-of-trade presentation. 
Nevertheless, the rather tart tone that had 
ch aracterized many such exch anges 
during the early 1950s, including those in 
learned journals, seemed now to be subsiding 
into a more conventional intellectual give-
and-take that concentrated increasingly 
on statistical and analytical rigour rather 
than on ideology.- But if United States 
academicians seemed generally to be rethink-
ing their earlier interpretations of the 
CEPAL Doctrine, this was not the case 
with the business community. On the 
contrary, their criticisms —of CEPAL in 
United States: The Changing Political Realities, 
edited by Julio Cotler and Richard R. Fagen, Stan-
ford, Stanford University Press, 1974, page 213. 
This period was marked by the begining 
of a series of learned articles much more favourable 
to the CEPAL Thesis. Some examples are "The 
Economics of Prebisch and ECLA" by Werner 
Baer in Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, January 1962; "The Prebisch Thesis: 
A Theory of Industrialism for Latin America" by 
Charles A. Frankenhoff in Journal of Inter-Amer-
ican Studies, April 1962, and especially the articles 
by Albert Hirschman, Joseph Grunwald and 
David Felix in Latin American Issues, Essays and 
Comments, edited by Albert O. Hirschman, New 
York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961. Pro-
fessor Hirschman's paper entitled "Ideologies 
of Economic Develo pment in Latin America'' 
(and especially the chapter entitled "The Present 
Scene and the Commanding Position of KOLA") 
is particularly noteworthy in this context. 
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general and of Prebisch in particular-
seemed if anything to have become increas-
ingly bitter. As previously mentioned, 
during virtually the entire preceding 
decade the views of the United States 
business community had been at one with 
those of both the United States government 
and many academic economists. Now a 
quantum change seemed to have occurred, 
since the substance of the Punta del Este 
Charter contained so much of the original 
CEPAL Doctrine. The displeasure of 
businessmen over this changing state of 
affairs was clearly expressed by many 
spokesmen, perhaps most clearly of all in a 
lengthy article and related editorial that 
appeared in the February 1962 issue of 
Fortune Magazine, just a year after the 
Alianza had begun. According to that issue: 
"The main burden (of the ECLA doc-
trine) is that Latin America is unfairly 
handicapped in its economic relations 
with the rest of the world. To achieve 
self-sustaining growth quickly it 
cannot rely on the free play of market 
forces but must resort to government-
administered industrialization... The 
chief author (of the ECLA Doctrine) 
is ECLA's Executive Secretary Raúl 
Prebisch, one of those politically-
minded economists who tailor their 
economics to fit their objectives... 
Most of the rest of the ECLA Doctrine 
is, to say the least, debatable... (this 
Doctrine) implies heavy intervention 
by Latin American governments in 
economic programming. It puts 
little emphasis on exports, or on sound 
money, or on the role of private 
foreign investment... Suspicion of 
industrialized nations and especially 
of the United States, contempt for 
free markets, an emphasis on bureau-
cracy: none of these are ECLA inventions 
but ECLA has given all of them a more 
or less coherent rationale." 
And there were many others as well. 
Thus Business Week (11 November 1961), 
referring to the Punta del Este Conference, 
stated that: 
" . . . at that Conference, Raúl Pre-
bisch attempted to have himself estab-
lished at the head of a committee that 
would oversee the Alliance economic 
planning. But Prebisch failed be-
cause... many North Americans are 
skeptical of the ideas held by Prebisch 
on economic planning and development, 
which place heavy reliance on govern-
ment action." 
In the same vein the Wall Street Journal 
(6 June 1963) felt that: 
"Mr. Prebisch's ideas might not be 
especially noteworthy except that they 
also form the basic doctrine of Presi-
dent Kennedy's much heralded 
Alliance for Progress. In fact, Mr. 
Prebisch is the Alliance's intellectual 
godfather. But the methods Mr. 
Prebisch proposed strike many econo-
mists as poor alternatives... Some 
experts in fact believe the Alliance 
won't get off the ground as long as it 
retains its fetish for government plan-
ning and United States aid... The 
evident lack of support from the wealthy 
few with ready investment resources 
is perhaps one of the greatest drawbacks 
in Mr. Prebisch's economic pro-
gramme." 
A few months later, the Wall Street 
Journal (16 October 1963) carried its 
criticisms to a more global and geo-political 
level by editorializing that: 
" . . . another aspect of this reformist 
confusion is the insistence that Latin 
American nations draw up grand eco-
nomic plans... as though our own 
affluence were the result of state plan-
ning. Naturally this encourages the 
socialist tendencies which are already 
abundant in the (Latin American) 
area". 
72 
In a nutshell, then, whereas the first 
decade of CEPAL'S existence had been 
one of strong opposition by the United 
States government, United States aca-
demics, and United States business sectors, 
the next half decade represented a complete 
turn-around by the government, and a 
quieter, more measured response by aca-
demics, although the antipathy of the 
business community remained largely 
unchanged. But even the partial honey-
moon with the United States government 
during this period was to be short-lived. 
And soon none of it was to matter very much, 
one way or another. For within a few years 
after the Alianza was initiated, still another 
stage of United States-CEPAL relations had 
begun. In this fourth phase, lasting 
roughly another full decade, the United 
States neither opposed nor supported 
CEPAi. but rather ignored it. An era of 
bening neglect had begun. 
Ill 
1963-1973:>* Decade of Benign 
Neglect 
Doubts at CEPAL'S birth, strong opposition 
from 1948 through 1958, a reversal of this 
attitude until 1963, and then a decade of 
virtual indifference. What explains this 
fourth major epoch in the official United 
States attitude towards CEPAL? There are 
probably four main reasons. One relates to 
the fact that the Alianza itself soon began to 
"lose its way". Why this occurred when it 
did, for such a broadly and positively struc-
tured hemispheric initiative, is a complex 
story that has been widely analysed by many 
Latin American and United States special-
ists and need not be repeated here. By most 
accounts, however, the attainments of the 
Alianza quite soon began to fall short of the 
goals that had been originally set for it.21 
2 1 
Two comprehensive accounts, from April 
United States and Latin American vantage points 
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As this began to take place, the links —both 
institutional and intellectual— that had 
just started to emerge between the United 
States government and CEPAL, began to 
unravel and finally parted completely. 
The second reason is quite a different one: 
namely, that CEPAL's earlier development 
ideology, which had so permeated the sub-
stance of the Punta del Este Charter, was 
not subjected to a continuous process of 
dynamic renovation within CEPAL itself. 
On the contrary, after so many years of act-
ing as a crusading challenger vis-á-vis the 
United States, the very fact of being "accept-
ed" by that country seemed to result in 
CEPAL becoming inward-looking and en-
grossed essentiall in short-term day-to-
day matters, to ^uch a point, in fact, 
that its longer-term "think-tank" functions, 
which earlier had given it such strong ideo-
logical underpinnings, were now being 
given less attention. As an analogy, it might 
be said that before the Alianza, CEPAL had 
been engaged in a continuous process of 
building up a new stock of intellectual capi-
tal, whereas afterwards it was involved more 
in drawing from rather than in renovating 
that past accumulation. A third reason 
involved the growing role of other institu-
tional elements of the inter-American sys-
tem: for example, the rapid growth in size 
and influence of the IDB, the momentum 
given to the OAS by its new CIAP* country-
review activities, the newly-emerging inde-
pendent secretariats of the Central Ameri-
can and LAFTA integration movements, and 
even the creation of the Latin American 
for Economic and Social Planning Institute 
(ILPES) within the CEPAL structure itself. 
respectively, are Levinson's and Onis' book The 
Alliance that Lost its Way (previously cited), and 
for article by the then President of Chile, Eduardo 
Freí Montalva, also entitled "The Alliance that 
Lost its Way", published in Foreign Affairs of April 
1967. 
*CIAP is the Spanish acronym —also generally 
used in English— for the Inter-American Commit-
tee of the Alliance for Progress. 
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The United States had become increasingly 
anxious to ensure rapid operational results 
in Latin America in order to make the 
Alianza a "success story". Hence it 
increasingly favoured those organizations 
such as the IDB and OAS which, with large 
staffs and budgets, seemed likely to provide 
pragmatic operational results in the short 
term. CEPAL, whose comparative advan-
tage was still largely in the realm of generat-
ing ideas, was thus pushed further and 
further out of the limelight of the inter-
American system. Fourthly, two incidents 
of much personal significance took place 
within a few months of each other during 
1963: the tragic assassination of President 
Kennedy on the one hand, and Dr. Prebisch's 
departure from CEPAL to become the first 
Secretary-Gen eral of UNCTAD on the other. 
The disappearance of a United States Pres-
ident who had been such a personal support-
er of the Alianza, and the concurrent crea-
tion of UNCTAD as a forum for the emerging 
"Third World" force, added new dimen-
sions to an already complicated series of 
United States relationships within the hemi-
sphere and especially with CEPAL. 
As all these powerful forces interacted 
and spread, the United States development 
spotlight shifted inevitably from CKPAL to 
UNCTAl). To put this in a different way, 
CEPAL's dynamic impulses of the 1950s 
had begun to change in form and structure 
during the 1960s: partly due to the disinte-
gration of the Alianza, partly because Viet-
nam diverted great-power priorities and 
resources away from issues of global devel-
opment towards those of global security, 
and partly because of UNCTAD's very cre-
ation. It was a double paradox. On the one 
hand the emergence of UNCTAD had helped 
to transform the original CEPAL Doc-
trine from a regional to a global schema, 
but in so doing CEPAL's own institutional 
role diminished.- From the view-point of 
¿¿For a more detailed examination of this point, 
the United States —which is the theme of 
this paper— neither CEPAL nor UNCTAD 
ranked high in global priorities, since there 
was still no organic United States approach 
to international co-operation for develop-
ment. Security considerations were ob-
viously paramount in the wake of Vietnam, 
while between CEPAL and UNCTAD, CEPAL 
was definitely secondary. Equally paradoxi-
cally, Prebisch's very achievement in put-
ting a Latin American imprint upon the 
new UNCTAD machinery added further to 
CEPAL's problem of maintaining, let alone 
enhancing, its own institutional dyna-
mism. The global stage was changing con 
stantly, as were the actors on it. But within 
this scenario of constant change and flux, 
CEPAL as an institutional entity gave a 
definite impression of moving from centre-
stage into the wings. It continued with its 
regular work programmes, but while these 
were fully satisfactory for day-to-day pur 
poses, this led some Latin American mem 
ber governments to begin looking further 
afield towards new global policies, new 
global institutions, and perhaps most sig-
nificant of all in the longer run, towards 
new private commercial and financial sys-
terns. The region was in the throes of some 
very fundamental economic transfor-
mations, not the least being a reorientation 
of the earlier import-substitution-industri-
alization thrust towards a steadily greater 
degree of openness to the world's major 
trade and financial markets. In these ever 
changing circumstances. CEPAL gave the 
appearance of lagging behind, at least in 
comparison with earlier years.. This per-
see "Pearson and UNCTAD: A Comparison" by 
David H. Pollock, International Development 
Review, Society for International Development, 
Washington, D.C., Volume XII, N" 4. 1970. pp. 
14-21. 
' Another factor at play during this period 
—of particular relevance to United States academ 
ic perceptions of Ci-PAL.— was the emergence of 
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ception of reduced relevancy was not lost 
on the United States government. It no 
longer scorned, feared or distrusted CEPAL, 
and neither did it look to CEPAL for new 
ideas: it simply regarded it as an insti 
tutional entity of low priority in the emerg-
ing global scheme of things. 
IV 
1973-1978: A Cautious Reappraisal 
This half decade marks the fifth in a series 
of "new looks" that the United States 
government has taken at ( l PAL since the 
end of World War n. Although it is still too 
early to form a clear judgement about this 
particular era, which has in any case not yet 
fully run its course, a number of recent 
events —some symbolic and some substan-
tive— suggest a cautious reawakening of 
interest by the United States Administra-
tion in what it perceives as a "new CEPAL". 
If I am correct in this latter hypothesis, 
it is a relatively recent phenomenon, for 
during the major part of the Nixon/Ford 
Administrations the United States dele-
gations to the various CEPAL ministerial 
sessions gave the impression of being some-
what defensive in their relations with both 
the Latin American member governments 
and with the CEPAL secretariat. Basically 
this was a carry-over from the broader 
hemispheric situation that had existed after 
the Alliance for Progress finally lost its 
way. Governments, like nature, abhor a 
vacuum. Hence, when the Alianza and its 
concomitant "special relationship" began to 
the new "dependency" school of developmen t 
literature in Latin America. Although several 
CEPAi. staff members figured prominently in this 
school, its membership was widely diversified 
throughout the region. In any case the writings 
emanating from the dependency school quickly 
began to generate a web of intellectual links with 
the United States academic community. This in 
turn was at least partly responsible for some deflec-
tion ot attention away from CEPAI's earlier 
writings. 
weaken, and nothing new and substantive 
emerged to take its place, the ensuing 
policy vacuum was automatically filled by 
slogans (the "Low Profile", the "Mature 
Partnership", the "New Dialogue", the 
"New Community", the "Spirit of Tlate-
lolco", and others), by the creation of new 
committees, and by the convening of nu-
merous meetings and conferences bilat-
erally or under the inter-American aegis. 
But all this could not disguise the fact 
that, from the mid-1960s through the early 
1970s, theory, policy and institutional ma-
chinery were no longer converging around 
the goal of United States-Latin American 
co-operation for development. Hence the 
defensiveness mentioned above largely orig-
inated from the question of whether the 
"Low Profile" policy was not in fact a 
"No Profile" policy. All this is highly sub-
jective, of course, but my recollection is 
that a noticeable air of testiness permeated 
most United States-Latin American meet-
ings on development policy after the de-
mise of the Alianza. The CEPAL sessions 
were no exceptions to this general mood: 
indeed, an additional complication emerged 
there as a result of the 1971 session in 
Santiago when the Latin American mem-
bers of the Commission created a new CEPAL 
subsidiary body called the "Committee of 
High-Level Government Experts" (CEGAN), 
with membership limited to representatives 
from the developing (i.e., Latin American) 
member countries only. According to the 
sponsoring governments, the reason for 
wishing to exclude the developed member 
countries was innate in CEGAN's very 
raison d'etre: namely, that it was created 
solely to enable the Latin American coun-
tries to come together and evolve a common 
regional position within the global evalu-
ation exercise underlying the United Na-
tions Strategy for the Second Development 
Decade. However, although the Latin Amer-
icans felt they should be entitled to utilize 
CEPAL for such an exercise, the United 
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States resented, on both juridical and sub-
stantive grounds, being excluded from any 
subsidiary body of the CEPAL "club" of 
which they —together with the United King-
dom, Netherlands, France and Canada-
had been full-fledged members ever since 
its creation. Thus, to the broader post-
Alianza problem of "globalism" was 
added the narrower problem of "exclusivi-
ty", with the result that, once more, United 
States-CiiPAi. relations were not very con-
vivial. 
Yet despite this general atmosphere, 
which continued into the early 1970s, a 
change seems to have begun to take place 
recently and the United States appears to 
be looking afresh at its relations with CEPAL. 
One reason for this, surprisingly enough, 
may have resulted from the very issue of 
exclusivity itself. It could hardly escape 
the notice of the United States that CEPAL 
was the only organization in the inter-
American system whose membership en-
compassed all the Latin American and 
Caribbean states (including Cuba) on the 
one hand, and that such diverse countries 
wished to use CEPAL as a forum to evolve a 
common regional position vis-avis the 
developed world as a whole and not merely 
the United States alone, on the other. All 
the Latin American member States of 
CEPAL —despite the wide variety of their 
respective economic and social systems-
supported, through CEGAN, the new sec-
retariat approaches to "integral develop-
ment". This very fact could not help but 
attract the attention of those United States 
officials who were engaged in rethinking the 
entire matter of North-South relations. 
One quite striking illustration of this 
was the first visit ever to be made by a 
United States Secretary of State to CEPAL 
headquarters in Santiago. The fact that 
this particular official was Secretary Henry 
Kissinger, that the visit took place at the 
peak of his power and influence (June 
1976), and that Secretary Kissinger took 
advantage of his visit both to make a formal 
address and then have an informal working 
lunch inside CEPAL headquarters with the 
Executive Secretary, Mr. Enrique Iglesias, 
and his senior staff, all combined to give 
that visit a great deal of public visibility. 
Additionally Dr. Kissinger's prepared 
text on that occasion: 
"My colleagues and I have great res-
pect for the work you have done and 
for the tremendous accomplishments of 
the Economic Commission for Latin 
America. This center of study and action 
has done much to ignite the consciences 
of men everywhere to take on the 
challenges of economic development. 
Your approach is progressive and, es-
pecially because it is non-political, it is 
effective" 
drew attention to the fact that the United 
States Administration was both aware of, 
and apparently now once again receptive 
to, CEPAL's reputation in the realm of in-
ternational development. The subsequent 
visit to Mr. Iglesias by Ambassador Terence 
Todman in 1977 —another first, in the 
sense that no Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs had ever before 
paid a formal call on the CEPAL Executive 
Secretary and his staff at their Santiago 
headquarters— provided a second illus-
tration of the apparent new line of the Carter 
Administration. A third example involved 
President Jimmy Carter himself when he 
referred shortly after his inauguration (on 
the occasion of his first Pan-American Day 
Address in April 1976) to the fact that "The 
United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America is the source of many cre-
ative ideas on development throughout the 
world". Fourthly, an especially warm 
series of references to CEPAL was made dur-
ing the 1977 seventeenth session of the 
Commission in Guatemala City. There, Mr. 
Andrew Young, United States Ambassador 
to the United Nations and Head of the 
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United States delegation to that session, 
said: 
"The Economic Commission for Latin 
America has achieved a very special 
stature in the modern world. ECLA... 
has acted as a trail-blazer for the 
others... It has long been recognized 
as pace-setter in the still emerging 
vision of what a new international eco-
nomic order would look like... ECLA 
has been particularly important for its 
fearlessness... It has done pioneer-
ing work on the inequalities of the world 
... ECLA is a symbol of our need for... 
institutions that seek to integrate our 
separate visions... ECLA represents 
that thin but brave line of dedicated 
persons who represent the bridge from 
the contemporary world to the hoped-
for world community... We need more 
ideas, more initiatives and more cour-
age... And for one of the leading roles 
in this effort to develop new ideas and 
programmes, to lead the hemisphere 
in this effort, I propose ECLA... More 
initiatives should come from such 
groups as ECLA... ECLA is a com-
munity that can and in my opinion 
should take the lead in the melding of 
the concepts of social justice and eco-
nomic development... To find the 
answers that we all need, we will have 
to broaden the dialogue —a dialogue 
that ECLA has been involved in now 
for many years... This process of set-
ting priorities is an on-going one, 
and one in which ECLA has an impor-
tant role. For ECLA is one of our prin-
cipal "think-tanks", and as such should 
be protected and encouraged..." 
And finally, during the recent (June 
1978) celebration of CEPAL's thirtieth 
anniversary, Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance, in the name of President Carter, con-
gratulated the Executive Secretary and the 
entire organization on having been "...a 
significant contributor to the still evolving 
vision of a new international economic order 
(and) development with equity and jus-
tice. . ." adding that "We in the United 
States government wish to support and co-
operate closely with your efforts..." On 
that same occasion Ambassador Andrew 
Young sent a simultaneous message saying 
"I want you to know... that I will spare 
no effort to co-operate with you and the 
ECLA community in the furtherance of its 
goals, because I know you are committed 
to the spread of freedom and rule by law, 
to more social justice and economic devel-
opment..." 
After a decade or more of relative lack 
of interest, what is the reason for this recent 
apparent rekindling of interest in CEPAL 
by the United States Government? A partial 
answer might be gleaned from an 11 May 
1977 article in The Financial Times of 
London entitled "ECLA: A Think-Tank 
for Latin America". After referring to the 
attaiments of CEPAL's 1977 session in 
Guatemala City, the article concluded that 
the letter had been 
"...one of the more memorable in-
ternational gatherings held in Latin 
America for several years. The Guate-
mala meeting saw the reemergence of 
ECLA as the region's most influential 
policy-making forum... The impor-
tance of ECLA was pointed up by Ambas-
sador Andrew Young (who) threw 
Washington's weight behind ECLA as an 
intellectually impeccable body given 
to creative thinking about the future". 
A variety of interwoven factors appear 
to be involved here including, presumably, 
a desire by the new United States Adminis-
tration to seek new approaches to Latin 
America, provided they are consonant with 
the United States' global economic devel-
opment policies. There is no doubt that 
Latin America has changed enormously, 
within an equally-changing world economic 
scenario. In this hemisphere, President 
Carter seems to have put aside the earlier 
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Alianza idea of a "special relationship" and 
instead appears to be evolving a new ap-
proach that seeks to incorporate regional-
ism into an overarching global develop-
mental framework. If this is so, then a 
reawakening of United States interest in 
CEPAL could be explained on several 
grounds. First, CEPAL's traditional role 
of generating new ideas on international 
development, but with a distinctively in-
digenous Latin American flavour —its 
traditional "think-tank" function— may 
now be what the United States Govern-
ment is seeking for its own long-term 
goals. Second, CEPAL has recently been 
strengthening its work programme in the 
sphere of practical action, including ap-
plied research, technical advisory teams 
and other operational activities carried 
out at the direct request of Latin Ameri-
can governments. This stress on practi-
cality mirrors a short-term desideratum of 
the Carter Administration. A third reason 
is the interest expressed by the Latin 
American governments during the seven-
teenth session in Guatemala in using CEPAL 
as a region al forum for certain North -
South issues affecting the hemisphere. 
As already noted, CEPAL's membership 
includes all the Latin American and Carib-
bean developing countries, plus several 
major developed countries with geographic 
interests in the area. Furthermore, since 
CEPAL is an integral component of the 
global United Nations system, observer 
status at its ministerial sessions is auto-
matically available to any United Nations 
member country in West and East Europe, 
Africa or Asia. Thus CEPAL is unique in 
that it can combine regionalism and glob-
alism on the one hand, and on the other 
it can function simultaneously as a long-
term thinker, a short-term action entity. 
or as a potential forum for mini North-
South discussions. These basic character-
istics —which have emerged under the 
leadership of the current Executive Secre-
tary. — may well suggest that the "new 
CEPAL" is more interesting to the new 
United States Administration than the old 
CEPAL was to most of the previous ones. 
To conclude this section, let me say a 
few words on the reactions of the United 
States business and academic communities 
to CEPAL during the recent past. As re-
gards the first of these, some at least of the 
old animosities seem to have abated with 
the passing of time. In my view this is pri-
marily because United States businessmen 
have slowly come to realize that the ideas 
underlying the original CEPAL Doctrine 
were never intended to be anti-free market 
or anti-free enterprise per se. Rather, the 
intention was to effect a harmonious merg-
ing of both the private and public sectors 
into overall national development plan-
ning, for reasons of mutual self-interest. I 
am not suggesting, of course, that the harsh 
feelings of the earlier postwar period have 
disappeared. By no means. Nor is this 
likely to occur in the near future. What I am 
suggesting, however, is that there is a per-
ceived need today to cast more light and less 
heat upon what is still one of the most im-
portant and volatile issues in Latin America, 
namely the role of foreign private direct 
investment in the overall process of growth 
and development. In short, although the 
substance of earlier conflicts between Unit-
ed States corporate spokesmen and CEPAL 
has not noticeably changed, there has been 
a change in form: i.e., increased attention 
to specific cost/benefit analyses and nego-
tiating techniques, and somewhat less of an 
emphasis on broad ideological contentions. 
24
 For a more comprehensive presentation 
of Mr. Iglesias' views on Latin American develop 
ment and CEPAL's role therein, see (a) his article 
"Latin America: The New Regional and World 
Setting", in Cuadernos de la CEPAL, N" 1, 1976, 
and (b) his address delivered at the seventeenth 
session of CEPAL entitled "The Great Tasks of 
Latin American Development" appearing in 
(i PAI. Review, First Semester, 1977, pp. 246-279. 
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As regards the United States academic 
community, the wheel has turned almost full 
circle. In the early 1950s many United States 
professors felt that CEPAL'S theoretical 
writings were not up to the professional 
standards of academic economists and 
fell more within the realm of radical po-
lemics than of economic analysis properly. 
By the mid-1960s, however, academic cri-
tiques of CEPAL had, as previously noted, 
taken on a quieter and more measured tone, 
with the intellectual give-and-take in learn-
ed journals stressing statistical and 
analytical rigour rather than ideology or 
policy. Thus, by the late 1970s it appeared 
that the once-radical CEPAL Doctrine had 
now achieved quite widespread academic 
respectability in the United States. Of 
course criticisms continue,.0 but by and 
large the United States academics who 
refer to CEPAL now tend to do so largely in 
a favourable tone.. 
~' Interestingly enough, such criticisms as 
are still heard mainly centre around CEPAL's earlier 
terms-of-trade presentation: see for example "The 
Strange Persistence of the Terms of Trade" by 
John P. Powelson in Inter-American Economic 
Affairs, Spring, 1977. 
See for instance the recent writings of 
Professor Albert Fishlow, a long-standing United 
States academic specialist in hemispheric devel-
opment. In his latest paper, entitled Debt, Growth 
and Hemispheric Relations: Latin A merican 
Prospects in the 1980s, Berkeley, University of 
California, 1978, Professor Fishlow begins by 
not ing how ".. .progressively in the postwar 
period an indigenous and more nationalistic devel-
opment model had evolved... under the auspices 
of ECLA. These heterodox policies... (of ECLA)... 
had little affinity with the conventional trinity of 
private enterprise, free trade and stable prices 
that the United States advocated (but) ECLA had 
by far the strongest impact...". Professor Fishlow 
recommends a simultaneous expansion of Latin 
American import substitution on the one hand and 
greater access by the region to external commer-
cial and financial markets on the other, if Latin 
America's domestic growth objectives are not to 
be frustrated by the external constraint. He warns 
of the difficulties inherent in pursuing these dif-
V 
Conclusion: Some Personal 
Reflections 
When the Director of CEPAL Review invited 
me to write a short paper for this commem-
orative issue on the theme of "Some changes 
in United States attitudes towards CEPAL 
over the past 30 years" I accepted immedi-
ately, in the hope that such a paper could be 
of interest to those students of hemispheric 
development wishing to look back on United 
States-Latin American events for histori-
cal reasons, as well as to others who 
believe an examination of the past could 
help to provide ideas for future United 
States-Latin American relations. Once 
having accepted this invitation, however, 
I found the task much more difficult than I 
had expected, mainly because I wanted to 
keep the article short and balanced, yet I 
was inmediately faced with a number of 
dilemmas as to what to put in and what to 
leave out of the paper. For someone like 
myself, who has been with CEPAL for many 
years and in the Washington Office most of 
them, this winnowing process could not 
help but reflect many of my own personal 
ideas, no matter how hard I tried to trace 
United States attitudes towards CEPAL in 
a concise and balanced fashion. In brief, 
then, it must not be forgotten that this 
paper represents my perceptions of United 
States perceptions of CEPAL. 
Leaving this caveat aside, however, 
what concluding thoughts might be drawn 
from the sequence of events traced in Sec-
tions I-V above? Two seem particularly 
relevant to me. 
ferent objectives, including the problems of uti-
lizing policy instruments that can facilitate import 
substitution industrialization without at the same 
time discouraging exports. As noted in Section n 
above, such conclusions and recommendations 
mirror the substance of CEPAL's writings published 
a quarter of a century earlier. 
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First of all, on analysing the changing 
patterns of United States attitudes towards 
CEPAL over the past 30 years I could not 
help being struck by their "stop-go" nature. 
There does not seem to have been any long-
term continuity in the way the United States 
has responded to the substance of the so-
called CEPAL Doctrine. On the contrary, 
its attitude in this regard has been highly 
erratic: wary and suspicious before the 
birth of CEPAL, markedly negative for the 
next decade, a sharp 180 degree turn-
around for the ensuing half decade, an 
equally sharp cooling-off period for ap-
proximately the next decade, and an ap-
parent warming-up more recently. Does it 
not seem surprising that so many in the 
United States should find the CEPAL Doc-
trine unsound economically and dangerous 
politically for a few years and then mirabi-
le dictu in the next few years find it to be 
quite moderate and measured? More im-
portantly, could it be that, whether by 
opposing CEPAL or by not taking it serious-
ly, the United States was acting in a manner 
counterproductive to its own interests? En-
larging upon this latter point, I would go 
so far as to say, as a personal opinion, that 
the United States government could have 
found, and still could find, CEPAL useful to 
it from a purely self-interest point of view, 
for I feel that CEPAL'S writings serve as an 
advance indicator —as a bellwether— of 
enlightened Latin American technical 
thinking on development. Therefore one 
conclusion I draw is that a serious study of 
CEPAL'S writings —past, present and 
future— could be helpful to the United 
States government insofar as such a study 
could help define some currently important 
Latin American approaches to develop-
mental thought and action, while it would 
also indicate if it was in the interest of the 
United States to support such approaches. 
The United States and Latin America have 
long been circling each other warily, the 
United States looking at Latin America 
essentially from a geo-political point of 
view and Latin America looking at the 
United States essentially from an economic 
angle. True, these different points of view 
did converge for a while during the Alianza, 
but all too briefly. Indeed, at the risk of 
oversimplification, it is my feeling that 
the fundamental reason underlying so 
many United States-Latin American dif-
ficulties over the past 30 years has been 
precisely the differences in perception 
underlining these security-versus-develop-
ment priorities. If therefore I am correct 
about CEPAL's "bellwether" function, the 
utility of such a study would be self-evi-
dent. 
Secondly, on reading the preceding 
paragraph together with Section V, I won-
der if I would be justified in suggesting 
that, after 30 years of ever-changing and 
mainly negative United States attitudes 
towards CEPAL, a closer relationship might 
in fact already be emerging and might be 
a good thing? Perhaps, although this is 
by no means certain. The costs and ben-
efits in this regard were well summarized 
in the May 1977 Financial Times when 
it said that: 
"Washington's approval of ECLA, as 
Mr. Iglesias would be the first to 
realize, can mean the kiss of death to a 
body that seeks to represent Latin 
America. But this time Ambassador 
Young's support could also be a kiss of 
life, as he recognizes in ECLA an impor-
tant forum for dialogue between the 
United States and Latin America". 
The world is at an historic postwar junc-
ture, moving slowly away from a quarter 
century of East-West security priorities to-
wards a new quarter century of North-South 
development priorities. At least this is what 
I believe to be a tenable hypothesis. If it is 
correct, then clearly many new ideas, new 
initiatives, and new programmes will be 
needed. Not so long ago, during the time of 
the Alianza, CEPAL responded to an anal-
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ogous challenge at the hemispheric level. 
Can it do so again, but this time from a more 
global viewpoint? If it does, will the United 
States be any more interested than before 
in CEPAL's evolving approaches regard-
ing a new international economic order? 
And, of equal if not greater impontance, in 
CEPAI.'S evolving views concerning a new 
internal economic order? This is the crux 
of my short paper: my strongly held person-
al belief that CEPAL can render service to 
both the United States and Latin America, 
as each region seeks new approaches: the 
former to long-overdue international re-
forms and the latter to equally long-overdue 
internal reforms. How fascinating it would 
be if the wheel could move full circle once 
more: if, as the 1980s begin, CEPAL could 
evolve new styles of development to influ-
ence internal economic thought and action 
as much as it did internationally at the 
beginning of the 1960s. 
In reaching this conclusion about 
CEPAL's future potential I do not wish to 
gloss over certain realities, for in the final 
analysis four main elements have always 
conditioned the way the United States 
views CEPAL: the global orientation of each 
United States government in power, the 
particular way each such United States 
government looks at Latin America, al-
ternative institutional mechanisms avail-
able to handle United States-Latin Ameri-
can relations, and the relevancy of the 
CEPAL Executive Secretariat (itself a func-
tion of the ideological and operational 
thrust of the secretariat, plus the person-
ality and capability of the Executive Sec-
retary). In earlier years, the United States 
reacted to CEPAL largely with opposition 
or neglect on all four counts. More re-
cently the reverse seems to be true. The 
challenge, then, is to ascertain (a) where 
there can be "common cause" between 
United States and Latin American devel-
opment aspirations; (b) whether those 
areas of common interest could be glob-
alized, and (c) how CEPAL could promote 
and give form to both processes. This, 
then, is the fundamental issue facing the 
United States and CEPAL as each —look-
ing towards the 1980s and even beyond— 
seeks new approaches to the long-standing 
but still unresolved symbiosis between 
regionalism and globalism. 
